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FORBIDDEN TERRITORY OR
WELL-DEFINED BOUNDARIES?
M.B.Z. V. CLINTON AND THE
OVERZEALOUS APPLICATION OF
THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
ANDREW HAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few issues have perplexed world leaders more than the IsraeliPalestinian border dispute and, in particular, the question of who
should lay claim to the city of Jerusalem. For many years, the United
States and other nations have labored to achieve a peaceful resolution
1
to this quandary, with little success to show for their efforts. Caught
in the midst of this fray is Menachem Zivotofsky, a young American
citizen who asks only that his U.S. passport reflect his country of
2
birth. His request, as simple it may seem, has created a constitutional
tug-of-war in which all three branches of the U.S. government are
forced to debate their proper role in the dispute.
Although the issue of who should control Jerusalem is
complicated and involves sensitive foreign policy concerns, the
3
disposition of M.B.Z. v. Clinton should pose no comparable difficulty
for the Supreme Court. At its heart, the issue presented by this case is
a separation of powers dispute with a clear answer. Congress passed a
law ordering the President to perform a task involving policy
*J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law.
1. See generally Isabel Kershner, Israel Supports Proposal to Restart Mideast Talks, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/world/middleeast/israel-supports-prop
osal-to-restart-mideast-talks.html?sq=israel&st=cse&scp=3&pagewanted=print
(highlighting
some of the most recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian border dispute, including the
ongoing difficulty of determining the future of Jerusalem).
2. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub
nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699).
3. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. argued Nov. 7, 2011).
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determinations over which the President has sole authority under the
Constitution. Instead of holding the statute unconstitutional, however,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decided it could
not hear the case because of the “political question doctrine”—a
doctrine that prohibits courts from calling into question decisions that
are exclusively within the province of presidential or congressional
4
power. Political-question considerations are not necessary, however,
for the Supreme Court to resolve this dispute. Because it has both the
jurisdiction and the practical ability to decide this case, the Court
should do so and should declare the statute unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Court should take this opportunity to clarify the
appropriate application of the political question doctrine so that
lower courts do not dismiss cases as non-justiciable that they rightly
ought to decide.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For over six decades, it has been the policy of the United States to
5
express no official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel.
Although Israel has claimed Jerusalem as its capital since 1950 and
has effectively controlled the city since the 1967 Six Day War, the
6
issue remains contentious between Israelis and Palestinians. In an
effort to help both sides broker a broader peace agreement, the
United States has chosen not to take a position on the issue until the
7
two sides reach an amicable solution. In compliance with this policy,
when issuing passports and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad, the
Department of State records a citizen’s birthplace as “Jerusalem”
8
rather than “Jerusalem, Israel.”
In 2002, however, Congress passed the Foreign Relations
9
Authorization Act. This legislation, specifically Section 214(d), directs
the Secretary of State to “record the place of birth as Israel” on
passports and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad for U.S. citizens born
10
in Jerusalem if they so request. President George W. Bush signed the

4. Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1231–32.
5. Id. at 1228.
6. Brief for Appellee at 6–7, Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 444 F.3d 614 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (No. 04-5395).
7. Id.
8. Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1228.
9. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2652 (West
2006).
10. Id.
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bill into law, but issued a signing statement explaining that he
regarded Section 214 as advisory and in violation of the recognition
11
power. United States policy toward Israel, he explained, had not
12
changed.
In October of the same year, Menachem Zivotofsky was born in
13
Jerusalem as a U.S. citizen. His mother, also a U.S. citizen, asked that
his passport and Consular Report of Birth Abroad list his birthplace
14
as “Jerusalem, Israel.” In accordance with State Department policy,
15
the Embassy refused, listing his birthplace only as “Jerusalem.” In
2003, Zivotofsky, through his parents, filed an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief, requesting that the Department of State list
16
Israel as his place of birth. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed his claim for lack of standing—since he could use
his passport regardless of how it listed his place of birth—and because
17
it presented a non-justiciable political question. The court ruled that
Zivotofsky’s desired outcome would require it to recognize Jerusalem
as part of Israel, which would be an impermissible infringement on
18
the Executive’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the district court’s decision on standing, ruling instead that
Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act conferred
upon Zivotofsky a statutory right to have his passport list his
19
birthplace as “Israel.” The court of appeals then remanded the case
to the district court to develop a more complete record and to
20
determine whether Section 214 is mandatory or advisory. On
remand, the district court ruled once more that the issue before it
posed a non-justiciable political question and dismissed the case for
21
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, a three-judge panel of
22
the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. In June of
11. Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1229. The “recognition power” refers to the President’s power
to recognize foreign nations, derived from Article II of the U.S. Constitution and discussed infra
Part II.B.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1229–30.
19. Id. at 1230.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1228.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine finds its roots in the separation of
24
powers principles envisioned in Marbury v. Madison, but the modern
doctrine is based primarily upon the reasoning and test set forth in
25
Baker v. Carr. In Baker, the Supreme Court considered whether the
constitutionality of a state statute allocating legislative representation
26
among its counties presented a non-justiciable political question.
What emerged was a six-factor test that directs courts to consider
whether the issue at hand presents:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of
a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing a
lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
27
question.

By articulating this test, the Court sought to identify cases that courts
could hear (i.e., where jurisdiction is properly established) but should
not hear because of the inappropriateness of the subject matter given
28
the proper role and abilities of the Judiciary. The Court explained
that the presence of any one of these factors could preclude a court’s
hearing of a case, but explained that there is a difference between
29
“political questions” and “political cases.” Cases ought not be
dismissed as non-justiciable simply because the subject matter is

23. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 610 F.3d 84, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
24. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (explaining that the Constitution gives
the political branches the sole discretion to make some determinations and that these are not
reviewable by courts).
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. Id. at 189.
27. Id. at 217.
28. See id. at 198 (explaining the difference between lack of jurisdiction and nonjusticiability).
29. Id. at 217.
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political in nature, but rather because of the “impossibility of
30
resolution” by judicial means. Employing this reasoning, the Court
found that the case before it was justiciable because it posed none of
the problems the Court identified, because the plaintiffs could
properly bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment, and because
judicially manageable standards were available for the resolution of
31
the case.
The distinction between political questions and political cases is
highlighted in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
32
Society. In that case, the Court was asked to determine whether,
based on federal legislation and international whaling agreements, the
Secretary of Commerce should find Japan in violation of those
33
agreements and make proper notifications to the President. The
petitioners argued that the issue before the Court was a nonjusticiable political question because it involved foreign relations
34
considerations that are best left to the Executive. The Court
disagreed and explained that “not every matter touching on politics is
35
a political question.” Furthermore, the political question doctrine
only prohibits the Judiciary from making “policy choices and value
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution” by the
36
other branches. The Court decided, however, that it needed only to
interpret executive agreements and congressional legislation—tasks
that the Court is well equipped, and indeed designed, to accomplish—
37
and thus declined to apply the framework in Baker. In so doing, the
Court sought to distinguish between issues with genuine political
questions—which courts are not equipped to decide—and issues with
merely political consequences—which courts can and should resolve.
38
More recently, the Court considered Nixon v. United States, one
of only two cases since Baker in which the Court found an issue to be
39
a non-justiciable political question. The Court was asked to consider
30. Id.
31. Id. at 226.
32. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
33. Id. at 228–30.
34. Id. at 229.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 230.
37. Id.
38. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
39. See generally id.; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that whether the Ohio
National Guard employed proper procedures for training and equipping its soldiers presented a
non-justiciable political question). Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion in Zivotofsky,
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whether the Senate conducted a proper impeachment proceeding for
40
a federal judge. This question, the Court determined, was nonjusticiable primarily because Article I of the Constitution grants
41
Congress the “sole” power to conduct impeachments. Thus, deciding
the adequacy of the Senate’s impeachment procedures would
necessarily require the Court to make determinations that are
42
explicitly reserved for Congress. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court found it necessary to “interpret the text in question and
determine whether and to what extent the issue [was] textually
43
committed.” Having decided that the issue was explicitly reserved to
another branch by the Constitution, the Court concluded that judicial
review was inappropriate in this instance and, in doing so, laid out the
44
appropriate textual commitment analysis for lower courts to employ.
B. The Recognition Power
The recognition power finds its origins in Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution, which grants the President the power to “receive
45
Ambassadors and other public ministers” from foreign nations. The
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that “[p]olitical
46
recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.” The Court has
long held that the President has the power to decide the “sovereignty
47
of any island or country.” This power does not just include the ability
to decide which governments to recognize, but also the ability to
“determine the policy which is to govern the question of
48
recognition.” Congress, too, has traditionally acknowledged the
49
President’s power to recognize foreign governments. The extent to
asserts that the scarcity of these holdings is a reflection of the narrowness of the political
question doctrine. See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1236–37 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Edwards, J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No.
10-699) (“The political question doctrine is purposely very narrow in scope.”). Additionally, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Court would be reluctant to deny itself the power to hear a case.
40. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
41. Id. at 230–31.
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id. at 228.
44. Id. at 238.
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This provision is typically referred to as the “Recognition
Clause.”
46. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964).
47. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) (holding that the President had the
sole authority to decide what country exercised sovereignty over the Falkland Islands).
48. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
49. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power of Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 312–13 (2001) (explaining that Congress never questioned President
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which the recognition power applies to passports is less certain,
though the Court has held that a passport is a “letter of introduction”
from one sovereign to another and that the President has traditionally
50
had authority over the issuance and revocation of passports.
IV. HOLDING
In July of 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the district court’s ruling that Zivotofsky’s claim
51
posed a non-justiciable political question. The court began its inquiry
52
by identifying the issue before it. Because Zivotofsky asked the
court to “instruct the Executive to comply with Section 214(d)” and
issue a new passport, the court framed the question presented as
“whether the State Department can lawfully refuse to record his place
53
of birth as ‘Israel.’”
The court concluded that granting Zivotofsky’s request would
require it to review a decision made pursuant to the President’s
54
exclusive recognition power, which it is forbidden to do. The decision
whether to denote Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel” implicated a
myriad of foreign policy decisions that amounted to choosing whether
55
Israel’s sovereignty extends to Jerusalem. Because the power to
recognize foreign governments is granted exclusively to the President
by the Constitution, his exercise of that power is not subject to review
56
by the courts. Zivotofsky, the court decided, was asking it to do just
57
that. By ordering the Department of State to issue Zivotofsky an
amended passport, the court would “directly contravene the
President’s policy” and “call into question the President’s exercise of
58
the recognition power.”
Zivotofsky argued that it was not necessary to invoke the political
question doctrine because Congress had already determined the
status of Jerusalem and the court needed only to enforce a federal

Washington’s decisions over which countries to recognize).
50. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–94 (1981).
51. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub
nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699).
52. Id. at 1230.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1231.
55. Id. at 1231–32.
56. Id. at 1231.
57. Id. at 1232.
58. Id.
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59

statute. The court asserted, however, that it was required to begin its
inquiry with the political-question analysis because it is a
jurisdictional analysis that must precede any consideration of the case
on the merits—thus, the court believed that it could not even reach
60
the question of whether it could enforce the statute. That
Zivotofsky’s claim was based on a statutory challenge to the
President’s exercise of power was “of no moment” to the court, which
did not want “to be the first court to hold that a statutory challenge to
executive action trumps the analysis in Baker and Nixon and renders
61
the political question doctrine inapplicable.” Instead, the court
concluded that considering the merits of the case at all would require
it to make decisions reserved to the Executive and it declined to do
62
so.
Senior Circuit Judge Edwards’s concurring opinion took a very
different view of the case. The judge agreed with the majority that the
decision whether to include “Israel” on Zivotofsky’s passport was an
exercise of the President’s recognition power and thus not reviewable
63
by courts. The judge differed, however, on the precise issue before
the court. Judge Edwards pointed to the important distinction
between lack of jurisdiction and non-justiciability—in the former,
immediate dismissal is required because the court does not have the
power to hear the case, whereas in the latter, “consideration of the
cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed” because “the
[c]ourt’s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether
the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially
64
determined.”
The judge explained that, because Zivotofsky had standing to
bring his claim and properly invoked the court’s statutory jurisdiction,
the real issue before the court was whether Section 214(d) of the

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1233.
62. Id. at 1232–33.
63. Id. at 1243 (Edwards, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1236 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). The majority
acknowledged Judge Edwards’s distinction between jurisdiction and justiciability as
“interesting,” and acknowledged that Baker makes the same distinction, but ultimately chose
not to “grapple” with it “because it makes no practical difference in the outcome of the case.”
Id. at 1233 n.3 (majority opinion). In either situation, the majority believed that it was required
to dismiss the suit outright. Id. Judge Edwards’s assertion is simply that making this distinction
allows the court to consider the constitutional validity of the enactment, where a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction would not. Id. at 1236–37 (Edwards, J., concurring).

HAND COMMENTARY 12.19.11 V.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/19/2011 6:19 PM

FORBIDDEN TERRITORY OR WELL-DEFINED BOUNDARIES?

69

Foreign Relations Authorization Act is a constitutionally valid
65
enactment. Because he agreed with the district court and the
majority that the recognition power belongs exclusively to the
Executive, Judge Edwards viewed it as “inescapable” that Section
214(d) violates the Constitution, and that Zivotofsky’s case should be
dismissed for want of a viable cause of action rather than for want of
66
justiciability.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. The Petitioner’s Arguments
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Zivotofsky advances two
primary arguments: first, that the case is not barred by the political
question doctrine, and second, that the statute is a constitutionally
valid enactment. First, Zivotofsky claims that the political question
doctrine does not bar the Court from hearing this case because he
“seeks only the enforcement of the very straight-forward command of
67
Section 214(d).” He argues that the doctrine only prohibits courts
from hearing cases that require determinations “beyond the
competence of judges” or that ask courts to make policy
68
considerations that are not “legal in nature.” These sorts of
considerations, Zivotofsky argues, are not required in this case
because Congress has already made the necessary policy
69
determinations by enacting Section 214(d). The political-question
analysis set forth in Baker, he explains, is not necessary when the
70
other branches have already decided the political issues at hand.
Here the Court is not making independent political determinations,
but is tasked only with deciding whether Congress has the authority
71
under the Constitution to enact this legislation. This is a separation
of powers issue of the kind that the Court is more than able to hear
72
and decide.

65.
66.
67.
68.
(1986)).
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1234 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Id. at 1245.
Brief for Petitioner at 25, M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. June 29, 2011).
Id. at 27 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id.
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Zivotofsky also argues that the relevant precedent in this case is
73
Japan Whaling Association rather than Baker. He points out that, in
Japan Whaling Association, the Court chose not to apply the
framework in Baker because “the central issue depended on
74
construction of a federal statute.” In that case, the Court noted that
interpreting federal legislation “is a recurring and accepted task for
the federal courts,” which Zivotofsky argues the Court should
75
undertake in this case.
Second, Zivotofsky argues that Section 214(d) is a constitutionally
valid enactment. In support of this proposition, he claims that the
Recognition Clause does not necessarily give the President the
exclusive power to recognize foreign governments and that, even if it
does, it certainly does not give him the power to determine the status
76
of particular cities or territories. Instead, Zivotofsky argues that the
President only has the power to conduct foreign policy in compliance
77
with or in the absence of congressional legislation. Where Congress
has spoken on a matter, the President must comply with its
78
directives. Finally, Zivotofsky argues that no meaningful harm will
come of the Court’s enforcement of Section 214(d) because the
Department of State’s dire predictions of the effects on U.S. foreign
79
policy are overstated. If any foreign criticism does result from
enforcement, he explains, it will be because “the Department of State
has magnified the issue and issued a self-fulfilling prophecy” of unrest
80
in the Arab world.
B. The Respondent’s Arguments
In her brief to the Court, the Secretary argues first that the
recognition power can only be exercised by the President, and second,
that Zivotofsky’s suit presents a non-justiciable political question.
Regarding the recognition power, the Secretary argues that it belongs
exclusively to the President and that it includes both the ability to
recognize foreign governments and to formulate the policy that

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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governs the issue of recognition. Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, she explains that this power extends to passports because
they are effectively “instrument[s] of diplomacy” insofar as they are a
82
form of official communication between governments. The Secretary
concedes that Congress may regulate passports to an extent “that is
necessary and proper to implement its own enumerated foreignaffairs powers,” but not to the extent that it constrains the President’s
83
ability to conduct diplomacy. The current U.S. passport policy with
regard to Jerusalem is a function of the President’s recognition power
because the decision of how to describe a place in U.S. passports
“operates as an official statement of whether the United States
84
recognizes a state’s sovereignty over a territorial area.”
The Secretary argues further that because Zivotofsky’s suit asks
the Court to call into question the Executive’s exercise of the
recognition power, the Court must not adjudicate the question in the
85
first place. In particular, the Secretary points out that the first Baker
factor calls for an analysis of the extent to which the Constitution
commits the issue before the Court to a determination by another
86
branch. If the Court finds that such a commitment is present and
that Zivotofsky’s requested relief therefore requires the Court to
review a determination that is committed to another branch, the
87
proper course of action is to dismiss the suit. It makes no difference
that Zivotofsky sued based on a statutory right because “Congress
cannot, by creating a statutory right, confer on the courts the
authority to decide a question that the Constitution commits to the
88
Executive.” A non-justiciable political question does not suddenly
become justiciable because Congress has put forth legislation on the
matter; rather, it is the type of relief the plaintiff requests that must
89
drive a court’s initial analysis. In the Secretary’s view, whether a case
presents a political question is “a threshold issue of justiciability” and
must be decided before the Court determines whether the plaintiff is
90
entitled to relief.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Brief for Respondent at 29, M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2011).
Id. at 31 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–93 (1981)).
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 52–53.
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Although the Secretary would have the Court dismiss the suit
outright as non-justiciable, she does propose that the Court should, in
the alternative, strike down Section 214(d) as unconstitutional
because it impermissibly infringes on the President’s recognition
91
power. The Secretary explains that the legislation “seeks to obtain
reversal of the Executive’s longstanding recognition policy regarding
Jerusalem”—something the Constitution does not permit Congress to
92
do.
VI. OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS
When the Supreme Court decides M.B.Z. v. Clinton, it likely will—
and more importantly should—conclude first that the political
question doctrine is not applicable to the case, and second, that
Section 214(d) is an unconstitutional infringement of the Executive’s
recognition power. The political question doctrine prevents federal
courts from deciding issues they are not equipped to decide—that is,
instances where judicial relief is impractical or inappropriate. Courts
are equipped, however, to decide issues of constitutional
interpretation and to resolve disputes over the separation of powers,
and the Supreme Court ought to do so in this case. Furthermore, the
Court ought to offer some guidance to the lower courts as to the
appropriate application of the political question doctrine.
A. The Issue Before the Court
The issue properly before the Court is “[w]hether Section 214(d)
. . . impermissibly infringes on the President’s power to recognize
93
foreign sovereigns.” Exploring the historical understanding of the
recognition power and Supreme Court precedent demonstrates not
only that the power to recognize foreign governments belongs
exclusively to the President, but also that this power extends to any
official action taken in furtherance of that power.
First, the Executive’s power to recognize foreign governments is
perhaps best understood in the context in which the federal
government first chose to allocate it. In the early days of the Republic,
Congress never questioned President Washington’s decisions about
94
which governments to recognize. In fact, President Washington never
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 53–54.
M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699).
See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 49, at 312–13 (“Congress never purported to tell

HAND COMMENTARY 12.19.11 V.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/19/2011 6:19 PM

FORBIDDEN TERRITORY OR WELL-DEFINED BOUNDARIES?

73

consulted Congress when determining whether to recognize the new
French Republic, in part because his cabinet unanimously agreed that
95
it was unnecessary. Thus, President Washington’s actions and
Congress’s acquiescence in the field of foreign relations suggest the
power to recognize foreign governments was intended to reside with
96
the Executive.
Second, Supreme Court precedent on the recognition power,
developed throughout the Court’s history, reflects this early
understanding of the power. The Court has not only held that this
97
power belongs exclusively to the President, but also that it extends
98
to decisions about territory that another country claims to control.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court has held that the Executive has
the power to “determine the policy which is to govern the question of
99
recognition,” indicating that the recognition power is not limited to
recognizing or not recognizing foreign sovereigns, but also includes
the ability to formulate broad policies that are employed in
furtherance of that power. Moreover, the Court has held that
passports are a form of official communication between sovereigns,
constituting a “letter of introduction” from one government to
100
another. This indicates that passports are more than just travel
documents and can be considered a function of broader executive
policies.
In light of these past decisions, the outcome of this issue seems
clear. If the President has the power to decide how to recognize
particular territories and the ability to formulate policy in furtherance
of that power, it follows logically that he may decide whether to name
a territory as part of a foreign country in official diplomatic
documents. It is counterintuitive to suppose that the President has the
power to proclaim that Jerusalem is not part of Israel but can then be
required to refer to the city in passports and other official documents
as “Israel.” This would almost certainly frustrate the President’s
ability to exercise the recognition power and to formulate coherent

Washington which countries to recognize.”).
95. Id. at 312.
96. See id. at 312–13 (“Washington’s actions reflect a consensus shared by Washington, his
cabinet, and Congress.”).
97. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (stating that
“[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive”).
98. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839).
99. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
100. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–93 (1981).
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foreign policy. Thus, under current jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court is likely to hold that Section 214(d) impermissibly infringes on
the President’s recognition power.
B. Justiciability
In Baker, the Court took care to distinguish between a court’s lack
of power to hear a case for want of jurisdiction and a court’s inability
to decide the issues before it for want of judicially manageable
102
standards. In the present controversy, the Court has both the power
to hear the case and judicially manageable standards for resolving it.
The case requires the Court to examine a federal statute that has
given Petitioner standing and to determine if that statute is a
constitutionally sound enactment. Courts are both familiar with and
103
In Japan Whaling
well equipped to undertake these tasks.
Association, the Court explained that federal courts ought to decide
issues properly before them so long as they are not asked to
“formulate national policies” or “develop standards for matters not
104
legal in nature.” The Court need not make these kinds of policy
considerations in this case because the political branches have already
completed that task. The Court need only interpret the Constitution
to determine which of the branches has the authority to decide this
issue.
C. Misapplication of the Political Question Doctrine
Thus, the Court has the ability, both jurisdictionally and practically,
to decide the separation of powers issue before it. The court below
determined, however, that it was barred from doing so by the first
strand of the Baker test—that is, because the relief requested by
Zivotofsky would require the court to pass judgment on a decision
that the Constitution commits to the exclusive judgment of the
101. See Calvin Massey, M.B.Z. v. Clinton: Whither Jerusalem? 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 87,
103 (asserting that allowing Congress to dictate how the President ought to treat disputed
territory would be “a cumbersome, inefficient, and awkward method of conducting foreign
relations”).
102. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (differentiating between lack of jurisdiction
and non-justiciability).
103. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[U]nder
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes.”); Lin v.
United States, 561 F.3d 502, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing statutory interpretation as a
“familiar task” for courts); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (explaining that
courts have the power “to review either legislative or executive action that transgresses
identifiable textual limits”).
104. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230.
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105

President. The court acknowledged the existence of the statute that
had given Zivotofsky the ability to bring his suit in the first place, but
determined the legislation did not make its hearing of the case any
106
more appropriate. It is precisely this statute, though, that not only
gives the Judiciary the power to hear this case, but in fact necessitates
it doing so. Although the Supreme Court may not challenge
constitutionally designated presidential decisions, it may prevent
107
another branch from infringing on the President’s power.
This proposition is highlighted in a 1976 article by Professor Louis
108
Henkin critiquing the political question doctrine. Arguing for a
more restrained doctrine (or, rather, the abolition of it), Professor
Henkin noted several “jurisprudential lines which are sometimes
confused with the ‘political question doctrine’ but which essentially
109
have nothing to do with it.” Among these are situations in which
“[t]he act complained of [is] within the power conferred upon the
political branches of the federal government by the Constitution” and
is either “law binding on the courts” or “not prohibited to [the
branches] explicitly or by any warranted inference from the
110
Constitution.” In these cases, Professor Henkin explains:
[T]he court does not refuse judicial review; it exercises it. It is not
dismissing the case or the issue as nonjusticiable; it adjudicates it.
It is not refusing to pass on the power of the political branches; it
passes upon it, only to affirm that they had the power which had
been challenged and that nothing in the Constitution prohibited
111
the particular exercise of it.

Such is the case here. The Court is not obligated to refuse
adjudication of Zivotofsky’s claim because he questioned the
President’s exclusive decision-making power. The Court may
adjudicate the claim and then decide precisely that: the President has
the exclusive authority to recognize foreign nations and he exercised
that power within the bounds the Constitution. In so doing, the Court
105. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub
nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699).
106. Id. at 1233.
107. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed . . . is a responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”).
108. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
109. Id. at 606.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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may also decide that Congress has enacted legislation that infringes
upon the President’s constitutionally endowed powers and declare
that legislation unconstitutional. This outcome, no doubt, is not the
relief that Zivotofsky envisioned when he brought his suit, but courts
are not required to dispose of cases in precisely the manner that
plaintiffs request.
Although some have advocated for a more expansive use of the
political question doctrine, even their arguments do not necessarily
contemplate its use in cases like the one before the Court. Professor
Rachel Barkow, for example, argues that the restriction of the
doctrine in recent years has led the Court to hear cases better left to
112
the constitutional interpretation of the other branches. Citing Bush
113
v. Gore in particular, she suggests the Court has made itself the sole
114
interpreter of the Constitution, which is something the Founders did
115
not intend. Even under this line of reasoning, though, Zivotofsky’s
case is still properly justiciable. Professor Barkow essentially
advocates for a return to an early understanding of the Court’s power,
when judicial review was rarely exercised because the Judiciary was
more willing to defer to the constitutional interpretations of the other
116
branches. She notes, however, that even in those days, it was well
within the Court’s responsibility to “determine how much interpretive
room a constitutional delegation of power gave the branch receiving
that power” and to “declar[e] the boundaries” within which the
117
political branches have room to make their own interpretations.
Determining appropriate constitutional boundaries is precisely
what the Court has been called upon to do in this case. Zivotofsky’s
claim does not reach the bounds of the political question doctrine
because it does not require the Court to make constitutional
determinations reserved to other branches. Instead, his claim requires

112. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 241 (2002) (explaining
that, while constitutional interpretation was once a coordinate task amongst the branches, the
Court has now put itself at the top of a hierarchy of interpretive power).
113. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
114. See Barkow, supra note 112, at 336 (“The current Court appears to believe that it
alone provides the final answer to almost all constitutional questions, while the interpretations
of the other branches are to be accepted at the Court’s discretion.”).
115. See id. at 246–48 (noting that Alexander Hamilton recognized that the resolution of
some questions is best left to the political branches).
116. See id. at 250–51 (explaining that, at the time of the Marshall Court, “[j]udicial review
involved a spectrum of broad deference to the political branches”).
117. Id. at 252.
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the Court to decide the boundaries of the recognition power and,
more specifically, to decide which branch is permitted to exercise it.
The unwillingness of the D.C. Circuit to perform this task thus
demonstrates an overzealous application of a very limited doctrine
and an unnecessary ceding of power.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the earliest days of the Republic, it has been “emphatically
the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law
118
is.” Here, the Court has been asked to resolve a dispute between the
119
branches about the powers granted to them by the Constitution. It
should do just that, and take the opportunity to clarify an important
yet easily misapplied doctrine.

118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
119. See Brief of Congressmember Anthony Weiner as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 19, M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2010) (requesting that the Court
use this case to resolve a dispute between Congress and the President and “to straighten out the
confused and misguided doctrine and practice revealed” by the case).

